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F. L. S.
DDP

10 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Intelligence
INFORMATION : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT : DDP Participation in CIA Operations Center

1. This memorandum puts on paper in more concrete form the proposals which I have discussed informally with you. It represents our current thinking, but has not been discussed with any of your people. It may raise difficulties for you, and I want to stress that we are not wedded to any solution. We will welcome your comments.

2. For many years, and especially since the advent of the Kennedy administration, there has been a trend toward more centralized and much more active operations by the US government outside normal duty hours. The DOD has established a genuine 24-hour command post in the NMCC, NSA has something similar, State has made a beginning with its Operations Center, and even the White House has been forced first to establish and then to elaborate its Situation Room. In CIA, since 1948 we have gone from a graduate student earning a few dollars for sleeping by a telephone to our present complex Operations Center, with a staff of more than [REDACTED]. Nevertheless, CIA is the only Agency in the "national security complex" which does not have a centralized out-of-hours facility. We believe the times require that CIA get

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into step, and we know that the present DCI expects to be no less well served than Mr. Bush or Mr. McNamara in this regard.

3. What is required is a single point which the DCI can call to be briefed both on information received and actions taken. We believe these requirements will be met if we can provide for the Agency a single facility to which all information available to any arm of the Agency is delivered and is scanned, from which all alerting of Agency personnel or other Agencies is conducted, and to which any other Agency can direct any inquiry. At the same time we recognize that CIA has problems of command and compartmentation which are unique. We think these problems can be met, however, by a co-location of elements of the various Directorates, each subordinate to its own Deputy Director and in full control of its own material, but each aware of what the others are doing and all able to cooperate in meeting the DCI's requirements. From these general principles we have developed more specific proposals for DDP participation in the CIA Operations Center, both in normal times and under crisis conditions. (The other Directorates should also be brought in eventually.)

4. The minimum responsibilities and authorities which a permanent DDP representative in the Operations Center should have to be effective are four:

a. He should be responsible for scanning all clandestine services incoming traffic, including that of [REDACTED]

b. He should be authorized to release any material in this traffic to the DDI, without regard for [REDACTED] "suspense", or other compartmentation procedures, if in his judgment support of the DCI will be less than required if a delay ensues.

c. He should be authorized to originate and release cables to field stations requesting

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clarification or amplification of earlier reports, or placing emergency requirements for reporting.

d. He should be responsible for alerting senior officers of the DDP on major developments.

5. There are certain other tasks which such a representative could perform which might well be desirable from the DDP's viewpoint, but which are not essential for proper functioning of the Operations Center. In general, they correspond to those duties now carried out for the DDP by his Senior Duty Officer outside normal working hours. These would include:

a. Keeping himself informed on all unusual activities underway within the DDP.

b. Briefing the DDP and his senior staff on these activities; in particular helping them to prepare for the DCI's morning meeting in both the intelligence and operational fields.

c. Acting for the DDP and his senior staff in ensuring that action is taken out of hours when required. (To this end he would require authority to call in desk-level officers and to release cables to the field on operational matters after consultation with them.)

d. An officer capable of doing these things must be a generalist of considerable rank and experience. Our problems are different from yours, but we have found our SDO's generally in the 35-45 year, GS-14/15 group. These men have not previously been exposed to such a broad range of problems, but they have adapted quickly. We have been able to get about two years out of each before moving him on. Among our more ambitious people, selection as an SDO is viewed as an honor, a step toward greater things, and a chance at quick promotion. In turn, we enrich our career service with a corps of versatile senior officers who can be counted on to handle virtually

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anything with speed, precision, and a minimum of fuss. [REDACTED] earned their spurs as SDO's.)

7. I think you should consider the advantages of a comparable system. Ray and I know when we leave the office in the evening that our affairs will be conducted efficiently through the night, that what needs to be done will be done and that our interests will be aggressively pursued. We know we will be informed in time to bring our authority to bear on the handling of a fast-moving situation, and will be protected against the trivial or routine. When we want to bring ourselves up to date on, say, Sunday afternoon, we have a number to call. Finally, and by no means least, each morning when we come in we have one man who has spent the night anticipating our needs for the morning: the memoranda have been written, the maps prepared, the proper questions asked, and the necessary specialists assembled. Once we had an SDO, we wondered how we ever got along without one.

8. For our people there are equal advantages. There are fewer night calls, and fewer requirements to come in, because the SDO is able to deal with the minor problems without calling and can be guided by a phone call to act on many of the larger ones. Furthermore, there is less necessity for our officers to remain late in the evening waiting for the last telephone call or for the memorandum to be typed. They can give the SDO instructions and turn the job over to him: he has the staff--including typists, graphics specialists, printers, and couriers--to handle routinely jobs which would otherwise be major operations.

9. In addition to providing yourself with services such as these, you would by placing a duty officer in the Operations Center make him privy to a wide range of information not now available to the Cable Secretariat or your Intelligence Watch. This

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includes not only positive intelligence drawn from such sources as NSA, EPIC, and [REDACTED] but also operational information from our round-the-clock representative in the NMCC and our connections with NSA, State Operations, and the White House Situation Room. It also includes information on important meetings to be held, what is worrying the President, and above all, what the DCI is giving his attention to and what his plans are. Having this knowledge will make your duty officer better able to serve you and keep your Directorate fully and immediately responsive to the requirements of the day.

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10. We have no illusions that all this would be as easy for you as it sounds. However, whereas we have had to build up from scratch, you would have an "infrastructure" already functioning. We would supply your duty officer, and his assistants if he needs them, with space, special communications, other facilities, clerical and other support around the clock. This would include 24-hour tube service to Cable Secretariat and Signal Center. Your people would be provided with a desk or desks adjacent to that of our SDO, and in addition would have a private office. The Operations Center is designed and located so that a SDO duty officer would be able to deal with other SDO officers without the necessity for admitting them to the Special Center, although this too could be done whenever necessary. We think these arrangements are good enough so that your business could be efficiently conducted with due regard for clandestine services security. Your traffic would remain at all times under control of your representatives, unless they decided to release it. If more space or more support is necessary, we will do our best to find a way of providing it.

11. All the above applies largely to normal operations. In crises, we would expect to follow the DCI's memorandum of 17 May. Responsibility for management of the crisis would pass from the

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senior duty officer to a task force supported by the Operations Center. Your Divisions would be represented on and be responsive to the task force. Since all crises are different, it is impossible to be too specific beyond this point. The Operations Center is provided with space to house two such task forces at once on the scale of that operating during the Dominican affair, and in some cases it might be desirable to co-locate your Division war rooms with them. The DCI would be provided with a single set of phone numbers to call, and his questions and requirements could be sorted out on the spot by personnel with authority to see that they are met. The savings in time, people, and wear and tear on the nerves would be substantial. We have developed SOP's whereby the transition to and from crisis operations can be carried out smoothly and rapidly.

R. J. SMITH

Director of Current Intelligence

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